This paper presents a method for carrying out the calculus of the risk priority of failures in Failure Mode and EOE ect Analysis (FMEA). The novelty of the method consists of new management of data provided by the design team, normally given on qualitative scales, without necessitating an arbitrary and arti® cial numerical conversion. The practical eOE ects of these issues are shown in an application example.
F. Franceschini and M. Galetto Table 1 . Application of FMEA to the design of a cooling fan assembly (Stamatis 1995) .
. the potential cause of failure . the frequency of occurrence index (O) . the design veri® cation actions
. the detectability index (D)
. the Risk Priority Number (RPN).
The characteristic failure mode indexes are expressed on ordinal qualitative scales (Fraser 1994, Franceschini and Rossetto 1997) identifying the various levels of dangerous' situations. Tables 2, 3 and 4 show the qualitative scales mostly used for the severity, the detectability and the occurrence indexes (Stamatis 1995) . It is assumed that all index scales have the same number of scale levels.
For a generic design, after the identi® cation of failure modes, eOE ects and causes of a possible occurrence, the Risk Priority Number (RPN) is calculated. RPN is an index that expresses the risk level priority associated with each failure mode.
In the traditional FMEA approach, the RPN index is determined by calculating the product of the three indexes: severity, frequency and detection:
…1 †
In the RPN calculation, the assigned values on the three index qualitative scales are interpreted as being numbers.`Information initially gathered on the qualitative scales' is therefore arbitrarily interpreted and utilized on a quantitative scale with diOE erent properties from the ® rst one. In other words, the original ordinal scale is transformed in a new cardinal scale characterized by a metric and by the integer number composition properties.
The RPN is thus de® ned on a rather special scale, which, moreover, does not completely cover the range [1, 1000] of the integers because there are, for example, some`holes' corresponding to prime numbers contained in the range itself.
This arbitrary`promotion' of the scale properties brings about a series of problems in the RPN interpretation. In more detail, the data numbering involves:
. the de® nition of the RPN on a formally wider scale than that of the three component indexes, which generates a ® ctitious increase of its resolution; Table 4 . Qualitative scale for the detectability index (D) (Stamatis 1995). . the assumption that the scales of the three S, O and D indexes have the same metric and that the same danger level corresponds to the same values on diOE erent index scales;
. the assumption that the three failure mode indexes are all equally important;
. the possibility of identifying, with the same RPN, situations characterized by diOE erent danger index levels. For example, the condition assigning to (S, O, D) indexes the values (8, 1, 1) is considered at the same level as (2, 2, 2). Both situations determine an RPNˆ8. But is this statement legitimate?
The numeric data interpretation brings about the simpli® cation of the RPN calculation; however, it also increases the risk of moving its meaning away from the logic of the design team that supplied the ® gures.
The numbering Ð acknowledging`metrological properties' higher than actually possessed by collected information Ð can therefore cause a`distortion' eOE ect, which can partially or completely distort the contents Rossetto 1995a, 1998) .
Other methods have been proposed for the RPN calculation in the literature (Bowles and Pelaez 1995, Goossens and Cooke 1997) . However, they do not remove some of the complexities illustrated during the discussion. In particular, these methods are quite complex to manage and require the de® nition of special functions and/or a know-how that is not always available to designers. These issues stimulated the idea of setting up an alternative method to the traditional one. This method is able to solve some of the questions raised and, in particular, the need to introduce non-existing properties to estimate the RPN index. It also allows the design team to implement¯exible strategies to detect the most dangerous failure modes.
The method also provides the possibility of considering the diOE erence in importance of the characteristic indexes, so avoiding a further work burden for designers.
At the end of the discussion, an example of the new approach together with a comparison with the traditional procedure will be provided.
The method
The main aim of de® ning failure mode priorities is to draw the designer' s attention towards the most dangerous failure modes for the product. For this to be an important eOE ort improving the design quality, it must not alter the content of the information supplied by the design team during the analysis.
The proposed method is able to deal with information expressed on an ordered qualitative scale with no need to resort to an arti® cial numerical conversion of the scale. It can be classi® ed within the class of ME-MCDM techniques (Multi Expert Ð Multiple Criteria Decision Making) (Yager 1993) .
The use of qualitative scales raises a few issues for data processing. For example, in using numeric scales, the diOE erence operation between two scale elements is de® ned, but this does not happen for qualitative scales, which have ordinal properties only.
The method is inspired by the work of Bellman and Zadeh, lately`enriched' by Yager, for the solution of multi-criteria decision-making problems (Bellman and Zadeh 1970 , 1975 , 1976 , Yager 1981 , Yager and Filev 1994 . In fact, FMEA can be considered as a decision-making support tool for designers. The decision consists of de® ning the order to analyse (from a design point of view) the failure mode eOE ects of the considered product.
Characteristic indexes can be interpreted as evaluation criteria g j (with jˆ1; . . . ; n), while failure modes as the alternatives a i (with iˆ1; . . . ; m) to be selected.
The method considers each decision-making criterion (characteristic index) as à fuzzy' subset over the set of alternatives to be selected.
The grade of membership of alternative a i in g j indicates the degree to which a i satis® es the criterion speci® ed.
The model suggests a two-step procedure.
(i) Aggregation of evaluations expressed on each criterion for a given alternative (a i )
where RPC…a i † is the Risk Priority Code for the failure mode a i . I …g j † is the importance associated with each criterion g j . Neg…I …g j † † is the negation of the importances assigned to each decisionmaking criterion.
The negation of an s-point ordinal scale is calculated as follows (Yager 1981 (Yager , 1993 ):
where L i is the ith level of the scale.
(ii) Determination of the failure mode with the maximum risk priority code (a*)
where A is the set of failure modes. RPC…a i † is de® ned on a new 10-point ordinal scale as those values utilized for expressing index evaluations.
If two or more failure modes have the same risk priority code we may obtain a more detailed selection considering the indicator T …a i †ˆDimA…a i †, where the operator DimA…a i † gives the number of elements contained in the set A…a i †, and A…a i †ˆfg j …a i †jg j …a i † > RPC…a* †g. This term represents a second-step investigation for establishing a measure of the dispersion of criteria, related to a speci® c failure mode, around the RPC index. It gives an estimation of how many important criteria with high evaluations, compared with the calculated RPC, are present in the evaluation of each failure mode.
It is assumed that the importance associated with each evaluation criterion is de® ned on a 10-point ordinal scale similar to those used for index scales. It is also assumed that the same danger level corresponds to the same ordinal level on the diOE erent scales. Table 5 shows the correspondence map between the severity, occurrence and detectability indexes and their related importances. If the four scales do not have the same number of levels the mappings can become more complex.
From equation (2) we note that the Min operation selects the smallest of its arguments. If all arguments are high they do not aOE ect the min operation. Consider a criterion that has little importance, it will get an importance rating L k that is low on the scale. When we take the negation of this score we get something high. When we take the Max of the importance criteria with the evaluation g j …a i ) we still get a high score. Thus, we see that low-importance criteria have little eOE ect on the overall`score'.
It can be shown that the formulation suggested in equation (2) satis® es the properties of Pareto optimality, independence to irrelevant alternatives, positive association of individual scores with overall score and symmetry (Yager 1981 (Yager , 1993 ).
An essential feature of this approach is that we have no need to use numeric values and force undue precision on the design team experts.
We note that, in equation (2), we are implicitly assuming a logic to satisfy all characteristics that are important. The term MaxfNeg…I …g j † †; g j g indicates a value for a given criterion to the statement`if the criterion is important, then it has a high score' .
Equation (4) allows the selection of the failure mode with the maximum risk priority code. The rationale of the procedure is to consider the most dangerous failure modes to be those with the highest evaluations on the most important criteria. When two or more failure modes have the same ranking we provide a more detailed selection with the T …a i † index. T …a i † de® nes, for each failure mode, the cardinality of the total number of`equivalent' risk levels associated with all criteria.
The traditional FMEA is not able to manage situations in which characteristic indexes have diOE erent importances. Some authors (Raheja 1991 , De Risi 1996 suggest that an appropriate strategy is to analyse all failure modes that are above some speci® ed threshold RPN or above some severity threshold. For instance, a design team might set a policy where all failure modes whose severity is higher than 9 will be analysed in addition to those failure modes whose RPN is above 500. This approach recognizes the need to diOE erentiate the relative importance of the severity, occurrence and detection indexes, but proposes a rigid scheme in which the severity index is the most important. Table 5 . Correspondence map between severity, occurrence and detectability indexes and the qualitative scale for the importance associated with each evaluation criterion.
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Evaluation of risk priorities of failure modes
In some particular contexts it might be necessary to change the order of priority among indexes or to change the logic of their analysis. The proposed method overcomes these constraints. It allows a more¯exible structure for combining the index importances, and the possibility of de® ning diOE erent technical logics of analysis. If we change, in equation (2), the composition of the operators and the`tieranking' rule, the design team may build models able to express logics of synthesis diOE erent from that proposed. For example, we might de® ne RPC as RPC…a i †ˆMax j fMin‰…I…g j †; g j …a i †Šg, which represents a new logic in which the most dangerous failure mode is that with the highest evaluation on the most important criterion.
An application example may better explain the method.
An application example
Let us consider the example of a design of a cooling fan assembly (see table 1 ). Let us analyse four diOE erent situations.
(a) All characteristic indexes have the same max importance (L 10 ). This condition is very similar to the`traditional' FMEA, where all the indexes have the same importance.
I…S †ˆL 10 ; I…O †ˆL 10 ; I …D †ˆL 10 :
Calling a 1 , a 2 , a 3 and a 4 the four failure modes, the aggregate d RPC index calculation is performed as indicated by equation (2).
According to equation (3), the negations of a 10-point ordinal scale are: 
Conclusions
This paper introduces and discusses the application of a new method to calculate the risk priority level for the failure mode in FMEA. Data processing is performed by working exclusively on the ordinal features of qualitative scales used to collect information from designers. The method' s processing simplicity is comparable with the RPN calculation.
The main novel elements of the proposed method are:
. it does not require any arbitrary and arti® cial scaling of collected information;
. it is able to deal with situations having diOE erent importance levels for the three failure mode component indexes;
. it is able to aggregate design team information, even if they are expressed on ordinal qualitative scales; . it is easy to computerize.
